Sustained cooperation by running away from bad behavior  by Efferson, Charles et al.
Evolution and Human Behavior 37 (2016) 1–9
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Evolution and Human Behavior
j ourna l homepage: www.ehbon l ine .orgOriginal ArticleSustained cooperation by running away from bad behaviorCharles Efferson a,⁎,1, Carlos P. Roca b,⁎,1, Sonja Vogt a, Dirk Helbing c,d,⁎
a Department of Economics, University of Zurich
b Department of Chemical Engineering, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Spain
c Chair of Sociology, In Particular of Modeling & Simulation, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Zurich
d Santa Fe Institute, USA
a b s t r a c ta r t i c l e i n f o⁎ Corresponding authors.
E-mail addresses: charles.efferson@econ.uzh.ch (C. Eff
(C.P. Roca), dhelbing@ethz.ch (D. Helbing).
1 Efferson and Roca contributed equally to this research
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2015.05.003
1090-5138/© 2016 The Authors. Published by ElsevierArticle history:
Initial receipt 11 November 2014
Final revision received 15 May 2015
Keywords:
Evolution of cooperation
Positive assortment
Migration
Behavioral experimentFor cooperation to evolve, some mechanism must limit the rate at which cooperators are exposed to defectors.
Only then can the advantages of mutual cooperation outweigh the costs of being exploited. Although researchers
widely agree on this, they disagree intensely about which evolutionary mechanisms can explain the extraordi-
nary cooperation exhibited by humans. Much of the controversy follows from disagreements about the informa-
tional regularity that allows cooperators to avoid defectors. Reliable information can allow cooperative
individuals to avoid exploitation, but which mechanisms can sustain such a situation is a matter of considerable
dispute. We conducted a behavioral experiment to see if cooperators could avoid defectors when provided with
limited amounts of explicit information.We gave each participant the simple option tomove away from her cur-
rent neighborhood at any time. Participants were not identiﬁable as individuals, and they could not track each
other's tendency to behave more or less cooperatively. More broadly, a participant had no information about
the behavior she was likely to encounter if she moved, and so information about the risk of exploitation was ex-
tremely limited. Nonetheless, our results show that simply providing the option to move allowed cooperation to
persist for a long period of time. Our results further show that movement, even though it involved considerable
uncertainty, allowed would-be cooperators to assort positively and eliminate on average any individual payoff
disadvantage associated with cooperation. This suggests that choosing to move, even under limited information,
can completely reorganize the mix of selective forces relevant for the evolution of cooperation.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Paradoxically, the evolution of human cooperation is an area of re-
search characterized by both widespread agreement and seemingly in-
terminable controversy. Regarding the widespread agreement,
researchers generally accept that the evolution of cooperation requires
some kind of informational regularity (Frank, 1998; Henrich, 2004;
Nowak, 2006; van Veelen, 2009; Bowles & Gintis, 2011). In its most
general form, this regularity can be thought of as a situation in which
a cooperating individual is more likely than a defecting individual to
interact with someone who cooperates. Such a regularity means that
individuals who cooperate enjoy, with a relatively high probability,
the beneﬁts produced when others cooperate. This limits the risk of
exploitation and produces mutual gains that can support the evolution
of cooperation.erson), carlosp.roca@urv.cat
.
Inc. This is an open access article unIn spite of agreement on this point, a seemingly interminable contro-
versy persists because researchers often disagree bitterly about what
constitutes a reasonable explanation for the required informational
regularity. Genetic relatedness due to common ancestry provides an un-
controversial explanation (Hamilton, 1964). The details of genetic
transmission ensure that two actors with the same parents, as one
example, will on average be more similar to each other than two
individuals randomly selected from the population. This is an example
of an informational regularity that can support the evolution of coopera-
tion, and cooperation among kin is well established, well understood,
and widely accepted.
Reciprocal strategies can also generate the required regularity. Such
strategies share the feature that a focal individual conditions her deci-
sion to cooperate in somewayon information about current or potential
partners. Conditional cooperation can arise from simple rules based on
direct experience with a partner (Axelrod, 1984) or indirect experience
(Nowak & Sigmund, 1998), and they can also involve subtle conside-
rations that assign good or bad standing to a partner (Leimar, 1997;
Panchanathan&Boyd, 2004;Nowak& Sigmund, 2005). Though recipro-
cal strategies can evolve under the right circumstances, they can also be
vulnerable in many ways. They are often not especially robust as group
size increases (Boyd & Richerson, 1988), when agents make errorsder the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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when the space of admissible strategies is sufﬁciently complex (Boyd &
Lorberbaum, 1987; van Veelen, García, Rand, & Nowak, 2012).
In any case, with respect to human behavior the larger puzzle is that
humans routinely cooperate with genetically unrelated individuals in
situations where reciprocal behavior is either not possible or cannot
produce future beneﬁts for the reciprocator (Camerer, 2003; Fehr &
Fischbacher, 2003; Henrich et al., 2006; Raihani & Bshary, 2015). This
simple observation leads to questions of the following sort. Do humans
cooperate with unrelated individuals because they are responding to a
kinship-based psychology that is occasionallymisapplied, or do humans
have prosocial motives that evolved in part for reasons unrelated to ge-
netic relatedness (Fehr & Henrich, 2003)? One can ask analogous ques-
tions about cooperation in anonymous one-shot interactions and the
evolution of reciprocal strategies (Burnham & Johnson, 2005; Haley &
Fessler, 2005; Hagen & Hammerstein, 2006; Burnham, 2013). Answers
to these questions vary, but the upshot is that at least some researchers
have concluded that conventional evolutionary explanations based on kin-
ship and reciprocity are not sufﬁcient to explain human cooperation in its
entirety (Henrich, 2004; Boyd & Richerson, 2005; Bowles & Gintis, 2011).
Alternative explanations have been offered, and shared group afﬁli-
ation in a structured population is a controversial one (Williams, 1966;
Soltis, Boyd, & Richerson, 1995; Boyd & Richerson, 2005; Bowles, 2009;
Boyd, Richerson, & Henrich, 2011). If variation in cooperation levels oc-
cursmostly between groups, then individuals in the same group tend to
be similar. Group afﬁliation in such a case is an important source of in-
formation. Interacting with a group afﬁliate increases the probability
that a cooperator interacts with a cooperator, and it decreases the
probability that a defector interacts a cooperator. The problem with
shared group afﬁliation as a source of information, however, is main-
taining variation between groups. In a strictly genetic system at least
(cf. Boyd et al., 2011), selection within groups and migration will
often eliminate most of the differences between groups (Henrich,
2004). This destroys the information associated with shared group
afﬁliation, and in the end a randomly selected member of one's
own group will be extremely similar, in expectation, to a randomly
selected member of any group. Put differently, relatedness within
groups should often be low (cf. Bell, Richerson, & McElreath, 2009;
Hill et al., 2011).
The above reasoning holds when migration is global and unsystem-
atic. If cooperators ever ﬁnd themselves in groups of their own, migra-
tion of this sort will largely destroy this kind of grouping. What if,
however, movement between groups is a biased process? Partner
choice is an especially clear mechanism for generating biases in group
formation (Noë &Hammerstein, 1995; Roberts, 1998; Raihani & Bshary,
2015). Unlike reciprocal strategies, which condition behavior on a
current partner's recent behavior or reputation, partner choice con-
ditions one's willingness to interact socially on a partner's recent be-
havior or reputation. To give an illustrative but somewhat unrealistic
example, assume that cooperators, and only cooperators, always
know of some new secret place to rendezvous if they face too much
free-riding in their current groups. This means they can consistently
sequester themselves, even if their secret places are eventually dis-
covered, they can interact primarily with their fellow cooperators,
and they can consistently enjoy the gains from mutual cooperation.
Presumably this mechanism would support the evolution of coope-
ration, but it requires that cooperators have privileged access to cru-
cial information. As with green beards (Dawkins, 1976) and image
scores (Nowak & Sigmund, 1998; Wedekind & Milinski, 2000), the
informational regularity that allows cooperators to limit exploitation
is like a gift from heaven.
As this example suggests, however, effective partner choice can in-
volve distinct mechanisms (Noë & Hammerstein, 1995). Speciﬁcally,
one can opt out of a current relationship because one knows it is bad
(Eguíluz, Zimmermann, Cela-Conde, & San Miguel, 2005; McNamara,
Barta, Fromhage, & Houston, 2008; Roca & Helbing, 2011; Bednarik,Fehl, & Semmann, 2014), one can opt in to a new relationship because
of information suggesting the relationship might be good (Barclay &
Willer, 2007), or one can do both (Rand, Arbesman, & Christakis,
2011; Wang, Suri, & Watts, 2012; Antonioni, Cacault, Lalive, &
Tomassini, 2014). Opting in can lead to prosocial behavior because
competition for partners can lead players to use current cooperation
to signal that they would make good partners (Roberts, 1998;
Barclay & Willer, 2007). For people looking to opt in to a new rela-
tionship, this mechanism requires that the current cooperation of a po-
tential partner is a reliable and available source of information about the
potential partner's future behavior. As always, this raises questions
about where this reliable information comes from and how its integrity
is maintained.
Opting out of an existing relationship is different. Opting out relies
instead on one's recent personal experience. One does not need to
know how a potential partner might behave. Rather one needs to
know how current partners have been behaving. The informational re-
quirements in this case are considerably less stringent than for opting
in. Recent models suggest that opting out might work as a stand-alone
mechanism (McNamara et al., 2008; Roca & Helbing, 2011), but we
know little about how people actually use the option to leave others be-
hind. In particular, we would like to know how effective is a situation in
which players can opt out of their current relationships, but they have
no information about the kinds of partners they will face after doing
so. Put differently, how much cooperation results when players cannot
run toward good behavior, but they can run away from bad behavior?
To ﬁnd out, we conducted a behavioral experiment in which players
were distributed on a lattice. In every period, each player had the option
to move to a new location. After player movements, each player played
a social dilemmagamewith all the players in her neighborhood. Crucial-
ly, information was very limited, and thus players faced considerable
uncertainty when they moved. In particular, players were not identiﬁ-
able as individuals, and their histories of play were not publicly avail-
able. Thus, a player who chose to move did not know with whom she
would interact in her new location, nor whether her new partners
were likely to cooperate. When a player moved, in short, she took a
shot in the dark.
What a player did know was how she had fared in her past interac-
tions. Speciﬁcally, a player knew how many partners she had recently
played the game with, and she knew the payoffs she had received.
Players could thus infer the total cooperation in their respective neigh-
borhoods but little else. The key question is the following. When
coupled with the option to migrate away from one's current neighbor-
hood, can this kind of limited information allow players to avoid exploi-
tation often enough to reduce or even eliminate the disadvantages of
cooperating? If so, the result would show that non-random movement
based on limited information could have been an importantmechanism
contributing to the evolution of human cooperation.2. Experimental methods
Our experiment consisted of two treatments. To ease the exposition,
we will ﬁrst describe our main experimental treatment, the “choose lo-
cation” treatment. Afterwards, we will describe the control, which we
call the “assign location” treatment.
In the choose location treatment, each player was located some-
where on a 12 × 12 lattice. As explained below, sessions involved 31
or 35 participants, and as a result 20%–25% of available sites were occu-
pied. Because of this low density, participants who wanted to move
were not limited to recently vacated sites.
The latticewas on a torus, and thus no player was ever on an edge or
corner. At the beginning of a period, each player saw the current state of
the lattice (Fig. 1). She saw herself at the center of the lattice, and she
saw which cells were occupied for the rest of the lattice. In addition,
each player saw two neighborhoods of interest. She saw her eight-cell
Fig. 1. Example lattice showing the state of the population. Players were placed on a torus, and so they experienced no edges or corners. To show the state of the population, the torus was
displayed as a rectangle, where the focal decision maker was always shown in black in the middle of the lattice. Other players were shown in dark gray. The large blue rectangle represented
the neighborhood within which the focal individual could migrate. The small red rectangle represented the neighborhood within which the focal individual played the social dilemma.
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borhood, surrounded by a blue line.
The 80-cell neighborhood was the player's “migration neighbor-
hood.” Speciﬁcally, the ﬁrst decision a player made in a period was
whether to try and move to a new location. If she did not want to
move, the player would simply stay where she was. If she wanted to
move, the player had to request a move to a currently unoccupied cell
within her migration neighborhood. Because two or more players could
have asked to move to the same cell, a requested move was not necessa-
rily successful. If only a single player requested to move to a speciﬁc cell,
the move was always implemented. If two or more players requested to
move to the same cell, only one of themwas randomly chosen to actually
move. The others requesting the same cell stayedwhere theywere for the
period in question. That is, their requestedmoveswere not successful. Be-
cause density was low, the majority of requests, though certainly not all,
were successful (71.7% of 2844 requests).
After all movements took place, each player played a social dilemma
game with everyone in her “social dilemma neighborhood.” The social
dilemma neighborhood was simply the neighborhood of eight cells
around the focal player. Consequently, the eight-cell neighborhood
shown at the beginning of each period (Fig. 1) depicted the focal
player's social dilemma neighborhood if neither the focal player nor
anyone else moved in or out.
If the focal player did not want to move in a period, she knew she
would stay in her current location, and she made a binding choice for
the social dilemma. If she wanted to move, as explained above, she
ﬁrst had to request amove to a currently unoccupied cell within hermi-
gration neighborhood. Because a requested move was not necessarily
successful, a player requesting a move had to make two choices for
the social dilemma. First, she had to make a choice for the case in
which the requested move was successful. Second, she also had to
make a choice for the case inwhich the requestedmovewas unsuccess-
ful. Hence, the choice actually implementedwas dependent onwhether
or not the requested move was successful.
For the social dilemma itself, each player had an endowment, e. Pos-
sibly conditional on the success of a requested move, each player
cooperated by contributing her entire endowment, or she defected by
retaining it. If a player contributed her endowment, it was multiplied
by b = 2, and the resulting amount was distributed equally among
the focal player and all players in her social dilemma neighborhood
after all movements were implemented. Regardless of whether or not a
player retained her endowment, she received payments if others in her
social dilemma neighborhood cooperated. If a player ended up alone
with no one in her social dilemma neighborhood, she simply retainedher endowment regardless of her stated choice for the social dilemma.
In this case, she could not play, and efﬁciency gains were not possible.
Speciﬁcally, let n ∈ {0,…,8} indicate the number of neighbors a focal
player had after all movements were implemented. Given n neighbors,
let k ∈ {0,…,n} indicate the number of neighbors who cooperated. If a
focal individual ended up by herself, then n = 0, and the individual
simply retained her endowment and received e as a payoff. If n ≥ 1,
the payoff for cooperatingwas π(C)= be(k+1)/(n+1), and the payoff
for defecting was π(D) = e+ bek/(n+ 1).
In sum, each player made two types of decision per period. First, a
player chosewhether tomove. Second, she chose how to play the social
dilemma. If the player did not want to move, shemade a single decision
to cooperate or defect. If she wanted to move, she made two decisions
for the social dilemma game: one in case her requested move was suc-
cessful, and the other in case her requestedmove was unsuccessful. Im-
portantly, because each player played with everyone in her eight-cell
neighborhood, players were often members of multiple overlapping
neighborhoods. If a player cooperated, her contribution was counted
in all the social dilemmaneighborhoods the player belonged to. To illus-
trate this, imagine that Abigail, Bernhard, Celia, andDouglas are lined up
next to each other in adjacent cells from left to right. No one else is any-
where near them. In this conﬁguration, Abigail and Douglas each have
one neighbor, while Bernhard and Celia each have two. All of them co-
operate. Because the contribution of any single player is applied sepa-
rately in all her social dilemma neighborhoods, all four of them
receive a payoff of be. In particular, the contributions of Bernhard and
Celia are not diluted by the fact that they each belong to the social di-
lemma neighborhoods of two other players. This design feature ensured
that having a partner with many partners is not an intrinsic disadvan-
tage. If this had not been the case, all players would have faced incen-
tives to be in small isolated neighborhoods. By extension, if reciprocity
would have worked better with very few neighbors (Boyd & Richerson,
1988), such incentives could have inﬂated the rate of cooperation as a
simple by-product of extreme population fragmentation. Our interest
instead was in how movement can affect cooperation without incen-
tives that directly favor small neighborhoods regardless of cooperation
rates. For this reason a player's contributionwas counted independently
in all social dilemma neighborhoods the player belonged to.
After all decisions in a period were recorded, successful moves were
implemented. Then, contingent decisions for the social dilemma were
applied for all players, and payoffs were determined. In all periods but
the ﬁrst, in addition to the state of the lattice (Fig. 1), players received
three explicit pieces of information at the beginning of each period.
First, each player was told how many neighbors she had just played
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Fig. 2. Cooperation rates by treatment. Solid circles represent the choose location treat-
ment, while open circles show data from the assign location treatment. Using a logistic re-
gression with standard errors clustered on both experimental subjects and persistent
network clusters, the estimated coefﬁcient for the choose location dummy is 0.877
(p b 0.001). Choices were aggregated over blocks of ten periods to produce the graph.
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from the end of the last period to the beginning of the current period,
this information was also available by simply inspecting the social di-
lemma neighborhood displayed on the lattice (Fig. 1). Second, each
player was told howmuch she earned from playing the social dilemma
game in the last period. Third, she was told her average payoff per
period over all periods since her most recent move to her current loca-
tion. As mentioned above, players were not individually identiﬁable,
and their histories of play were not publicly available.
The procedures above were for the choose location treatment. The
assign location treatmentwas identical apart from one small but critical
difference. Speciﬁcally, each session of the assign location treatment
was paired with a corresponding session of the choose location treat-
ment. Choose location sessions were conducted ﬁrst, and the number
of subjects in an assign location session was identical to the number of
subjects in the associated choose location session. All sessions ran for
100 periods. In each period of an assign location session, participants
were randomly assigned to occupied locations, after movement, from
the same period of the associated choose location session. This proce-
dure was implemented independently in each period, and altogether
our methods ensured that the topology of the social network and the
spatial conﬁgurations of interaction neighborhoods were identical in
all periods of paired sessions. The only difference was that network to-
pology was endogenous in the choose location session and exogenous
in the assign location session. We conducted two choose location ses-
sions, one with 35 participants and the other with 31. Correspondingly,
we conducted two assign location sessions with 35 and 31 participants.
All interactions were anonymous, and subjects were fully and
accurately informed about the rules of the game. We conducted the
experiment using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) at the Decision Science
Laboratory at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich
(www.descil.ethz.ch). All choiceswere paid, with earnings accumulated
over the 100 periods. Participants were paid privately in cash at the end
of their respective sessions. The endowment in each period was 20
points, where one point was worth 1/60 of a Swiss Franc. For most of
our analyses below, we will normalize the endowment to equal one.
Participants received 10 Swiss Francs as a show-up fee, and the average
total payment was 53.10 Swiss Francs.
3. Statistical methods
Our data consist of 13,200 observations. To analyze the data, wemust
account for two types of potential dependence among observations.
First, we have 100 observations per player. Second, players interacted
in partially overlapping neighborhoods that persisted through time in
ways that depended on player movements. Previous research has
shown that choices in social dilemmas are often conditional on the
choices of others in the group (Fischbacher, Gaechter, & Fehr, 2001),
and in our experiment this kind of conditional play could have generated
choices thatwere correlated across subjects. In terms of data analysis, the
key to this kind of dependence is that the groups in our experimentwere
partially overlapping, and they were not ﬁxed. As a result, dependencies
could have existed between playerswhowere either directly or indirect-
ly linked, and these dependencies tended to change over time because
players moved. The freedom to move is precisely what provided partici-
pants with the possibility to leave neighborhoods they did not like. In
terms of data analysis, however, it means we must begin by identifying
the loci of potentially correlated choices in the social dilemma game.
To do so, we used our data to identify “persistent network clusters”
(see electronic supplementary materials, available on the journal's
website at www.ehbonline.org). Each persistent network cluster was a
subset of player–period combinations. Such a subset was characterized
by the potential for dependencies in choice to propagate across players
through time as players moved on the lattice and played the social di-
lemma. Each persistent network cluster persisted for one or more pe-
riods. To identify persistent network clusters, we partitioned the set ofplayers in each period according to the connected components in the
social network. We then linked the resulting subsets across periods ac-
cording to the similarities between subsets. This captures the idea that
network clusters persisted through time. Importantly, we implemented
a very conservative approach in the sense that any potential for depen-
dence, both across individuals and through time, was accounted for by
coding all relevant observations as part of the same persistent network
cluster (electronic supplementary materials, available on the journal's
website at www.ehbonline.org).
To account fully for both sources of dependence in our disaggregated
data, associated regression results and statistical tests used standard er-
rors calculated by clustering jointly on both experimental subject and
persistent network cluster. Clustered standard errors allow for an arbi-
trary degree of dependencewithin a cluster, but the calculations assume
that observations across clusters are independent (Verbeek, 2008).
Two-way clustering is simply a generalization of this approach that al-
lows for two different sources of dependence (Arai, 2011; Cameron,
Gelbach, & Miller, 2011). In our case, these two sources of dependence
were repeated observations per participant and the correlations in
choices that can occur when participants play social dilemma games
in partially overlapping neighborhoods.
4. Results
When modeling the social dilemma choices actually implemented
over all observations, we found that players in the choose location treat-
ment cooperated signiﬁcantly more than players in the assign location
treatment (Fig. 2, logistic regression with two-way clustering,
p b 0.001). Moreover, when participants in the choose location treat-
ment requested a move, they stated that they wanted to cooperate sig-
niﬁcantly more if the move was successful than if the move was
unsuccessful. More precisely, conditioning on the 2844 cases in which
subjects requested to move in the choose location treatment, players
stated a desire to cooperate 37.76% of the time if a requested move
was successful but only 24.61% of the time if unsuccessful (logistic
regression with two-way clustering, p b 0.001).
Conditioning one's current behavior on the success of a requested
move was a pattern almost entirely due to players who had recently
cooperated. Speciﬁcally, if we exclude the ﬁrst period of choose location
sessions, we are left with 2696 observations involving a subject who
cooperated in the previous period and 3838 observations involving a
subject who defected in the previous period. In both cases, players re-
quested to move when their payoffs were low. For players who
cooperated in the previous period, they were more likely to request a
5C. Efferson et al. / Evolution and Human Behavior 37 (2016) 1–9move in the current period if their payoff in the previous period was
relatively low (logistic regression with two-way clustering, estimated
coefﬁcient for lagged non-normalized proﬁt:−0.066, p b 0.001). The
same pattern was true for players who defected in the previous period
(logistic regression with two-way clustering, estimated coefﬁcient for
lagged non-normalized proﬁt:−0.048, p b 0.001).
Unlike players who defected in the previous period, however,
players who cooperated were sensitive to the success of the requested
move. For the 1026 cases in which subjects requested a move and
cooperated in the previous period, players wanted to cooperate
77.68% of the time if the requested move was successful but only
47.95% of the time if unsuccessful (logistic regression with two-way
clustering, p b 0.001). In contrast, for the 1786 cases in which subjects
requested a move and defected in the previous period, players wanted
to cooperate 14.56% of the time if the requested move was successful
and 10.97% of the time if unsuccessful (logistic regression with two-
way clustering, p=0.263). These results show that, once a recently co-
operative player decided it was time to move, she was more willing to
continue cooperating if she was actually able to move compared to
the situation when she was not able to move. The same distinction be-
tween successful and unsuccessful moves did not hold for players who
did not cooperate in the most recent period.
Most importantly, players used endogenous movement in the
choose location treatment to eliminate a payoff disadvantage that was
initially associated with cooperating. This payoff disadvantage occurred
and persisted in our assign location treatment, but in the choose loca-
tion treatment it declined through time until it disappeared altogether
(Table 1 and Fig. 3A–B). Indeed, over the last 50 periods of the choose
location treatment, cooperating produced the same payoffs on average
as defecting (p= 0.941, see Fig. 3B), where averages are over all sub-
jects within a period regardless of neighborhood composition. This
kind of convergence in average payoffs did not occur in the assign loca-
tion treatment (Table 1). Moreover, these results cannot be due to dif-
ferences between the two treatments in terms of social network
topology. The design of the assign location treatment guaranteed that
such differences would not exist. Altogether, our results indicate that
participants in the choose location treatment used endogenous move-
ment to eliminate on average the payoff disadvantage of cooperating
compared to defecting. Participants subject to exogenous movement
in the assign location treatment did not or could not do this.
To understand why this treatment difference occurred, we need to
understand the forces that controlled payoffs associated with
cooperating and defecting. Decomposing the difference between the av-
erage payoff of cooperation and the average payoff of defection allows
us to identify these forces. For this decomposition, let xit ∈ {C, D} denote
the choice implemented for individual i ∈ {1,…,I} in time period t ∈Table 1
Payoffs by treatment and behavior.
Parameter t ≥ 1 t ≥ 51
Estimate Std. error p Estimate Std. error p
Intercept 1.282 0.019 b0.001 1.210 0.011 b0.001
Coop −0.326 0.040 b0.001 −0.280 0.027 b0.001
Choose 0.130 0.033 b0.001 0.160 0.037 b0.001
Coop × Choose 0.240 0.077 0.002 0.284 0.052 b0.001
Results are from OLS regressions with proﬁt as the response variable. Proﬁt is normalized
in the sense thatwe calibrated the endowment to equal 1. Independent variables include a
dummy indicating if the subject cooperated for a given choice, a dummy indicating if the
subject was in the choose location treatment, and the interaction of these two dummies.
We ﬁt the model separately to the entire data set (13,200 observations) and to the data
from periods 51 to 100 (6600 observations). Standard errorswere calculated by clustering
on both subject and persistent network cluster. The signiﬁcantly negative effects for
“Coop” show that cooperation reduced payoffs in the assign location treatment. Fig. 3
presents additional analyses, in particular a test showing how cooperation and defection
produced the same average payoffs in the latter half of choose location sessions.{1,…,100}.We deﬁne cit as the indicator function of player i cooperating
in period t,
cit ¼ 1 if xit ¼ C;0 if xit ¼ D:

The corresponding indicator function for defecting is 1–cit.
Let Nit be the number of individuals whowere in the social dilemma
neighborhood of a focal player. Analogously, let Kit be the number of co-
operators who were among these Nit neighbors. We use the Kronecker
delta to identify observations for which the number of neighbors, Nit,
and the number of cooperative neighbors, Kit, equaled speciﬁc values,
δNitn ¼
1
0
if Nit ¼ n;
if Nit≠n;

δKitk ¼
1
0
if Kit ¼ k;
if Kit≠k:

With these quantities deﬁned, the mean payoff in t for cooperating
in a given treatment was
πt Cð Þ ¼
XI
i¼1
cit eδNit0 þ
X8
n¼1
Xn
k¼0
be kþ 1ð Þ
nþ 1 δNitnδKitk
( )
XI
i¼1
cit
:
Analogously, the mean payoff in t for defecting in a given treatment
was
πt Dð Þ ¼
XI
i¼1
1−citð Þ eþ
X8
n¼1
Xn
k¼0
bek
nþ 1 δNitnδKitk
( )
XI
i¼1
1−citð Þ
:
The difference in themean payoff of cooperation and themean pay-
off of defection can be decomposed as πt Cð Þ−πt Dð Þ ¼ e st þ at þ gtð Þ.
The quantity st is a “small group” effect of the form,
St ¼
XI
i¼1
X8
n¼1
Xn
k¼0
b
nþ 1citδNitnδKitk
XI
i¼1
cit
:
Conditional on being in a group with at least one other person, st cap-
tures how strongly participants who cooperated in t gained an advan-
tage over those who defected by moving into small groups and thus
obtaining a relatively large fraction, b/(n+1), of the beneﬁts generated
by their own contributions. If at least one player cooperated in t in any
session for a given treatment, which was always true, then st is well
deﬁned, and it must be positive.
The quantity at is an “assortment” effect, where
at ¼
XI
i¼1
X8
n¼1
Xn
k¼0
bk
nþ 1 citδNitnδKitk
XI
i¼1
cit
−
XI
i¼1
X8
n¼1
Xn
k¼0
bk
nþ 1 1−citð ÞδNitnδKitk
XI
i¼1
1−citð Þ
:
Conditional on being in a group with at least one other person, the as-
sortment effect measures the extent to which participants who
cooperated in t, compared to those who defected, assorted themselves
into neighborhoods with other participants whowere also cooperating.
If at least one player cooperated and at least one defected in t in any ses-
sion for a treatment, which was always true, then at is well deﬁned. It
can take negative values, positive values, or a value of zero. Speciﬁcally,
because bk/(n+1) appears in both terms, at N 0means that cooperating
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Fig. 3. Average payoffs for cooperating and defecting. The upper panels show the average payoffs for defecting (open diamond) and cooperation (solid diamond), and the relative sizes of
the symbols represent the relative proportions of the two behaviors across period–subject combinations. Panel A shows that, in the assign location treatment, cooperating resulted in a
signiﬁcant payoff disadvantage (Table 1). In contrast, panel B shows that endogenous movement equalized the average payoffs associated with cooperating and defecting in the choose
location treatment. The simplest approach to testing this is tomodel payoffswith a regression that restricts attention to periods t ≥ 51 of the choose location treatment. Doing so,with two-
way clustering, produces an estimated effect for cooperation of 0.003 (p=0.941). The lower panels decompose the difference in payoffs between cooperation and defection into the small
group effect (triangles), the assortment effect (squares), and retain endowment effect (circles). Panel C shows the assign location treatment,while panel D shows the choose location treat-
ment. Comparing the decomposition across treatments (C vs. D) shows that cooperating players eliminated the disadvantage of cooperating in the choose location treatment (B) but not
the assign location treatment (A) speciﬁcally because assortment differed by treatment (Table 2). For producing the graphs, observations were aggregated over blocks of ten periods.
6 C. Efferson et al. / Evolution and Human Behavior 37 (2016) 1–9players were in neighborhoodswith other cooperatorsmore on average
than defecting participants were in neighborhoods with cooperators. In
contrast, at b 0would show that cooperating participantswere in neigh-
borhoods with other cooperators less on average than defecting parti-
cipants were. Finally, at = 0 would indicate that players were not
assorted by choice in t.
Finally, gt is the “retain endowment” effect, where
gt ¼
XI
i¼1
citδNit0
XI
i¼1
cit
−1:
The retain endowment effect captures the different rates at which par-
ticipants who chose cooperation in t kept their endowments compared
to those who chose defection. Participants who chose cooperation only
retained their endowments if they ended up alone after all movements
and thus could not play the game. Players who chose defection always
retained their endowments, a fact captured by the−1 in the deﬁnition
of gt. Because defecting always meant that a player retained her
endowment, while this was not true when cooperating, gt must be
non-positive.
To see how players eliminated the payoff disadvantage of
cooperating compared to defecting in the choose location treatment,
we calculated the small group, assortment, and retain endowment
effects for each period of each treatment. Importantly, e(st + at + gt)
is an exact decomposition of the difference in average payoffs forcooperating versus defecting. The decomposition requires no assump-
tions; it simply expresses this difference in a particularly useful way.
For the calculations, we conditioned only on period and treatment.
We did not condition, in particular, on group composition. Indeed,
doing so would run counter to the purpose of the analysis because st,
at, and gt all summarize, in different ways, payoff effects that were due
to group composition.
In sum, our empirical strategy was to compare, across the two treat-
ments, the dynamics of each constituent force. Because e(st+ at+ gt) is
an exact decomposition, and because a treatment effect did in fact occur
(Table 1 and Fig. 3A–B), at least one of the forces must have differed,
though perhaps not signiﬁcantly, across treatments. Correspondingly,
by comparing st, at, and gt across treatments, we hoped to identify exact-
ly how subjects drove πt Cð Þ−πt Dð Þ from negative values up to zero in
the choose location treatment but not in the assign location treatment.
The analysis showed that assortment was the key difference be-
tween our two treatments. Players in the choose location treatment
were able to eliminate on average the payoff disadvantage of coopera-
tion, while players in the assign location treatment were not, because
movement in the choose location treatment generated positive assort-
ment (Fig. 3D). This kind of assortmentwas absent in the assign location
treatment (Fig. 3C). All in all, the dynamics of the retain endowment ef-
fect and the small group effect were statistically indistinguishable in the
two treatments, while the assortment dynamics were highly signiﬁ-
cantly different across the two treatments (Table 2).
Crucially, even though information was limited, positive assortment
developed through time in the choose location treatment because
cooperating players did not move in the sameway as defecting players.
Table 2
Decomposition of differences in average payoffs between cooperating and defecting.
Parameter Estimate Std. error p
Small group (st)
Intercept 0.381 0.022 b0.001
t 0.006 0.001 b0.001
t2 −3.475 × 10−5 1.438 × 10−5 0.017
Choose 0.011 0.035 0.749
t × Choose 5.286 × 10−4 0.002 0.779
t2 × Choose −8.866 × 10−6 1.909 × 10−5 0.643
Assortment (at)
Intercept −0.083 0.024 b0.001
t 0.005 0.001 b0.001
t2 −4.637 × 10−5 1.101 × 10−5 b0.001
Choose 0.013 0.054 0.813
t × Choose 0.011 0.003 b0.001
t2 × Choose −8.703 × 10−5 2.597 × 10−5 0.001
Retain endowment (gt)
Intercept −0.973 0.011 b0.001
t 4.471 × 10−4 7.467 × 10−4 0.550
t2 −1.288 × 10−6 8.394 × 10−6 0.878
Choose 0.026 0.014 0.063
t × Choose −6.928 × 10−4 9.633 × 10−4 0.473
t2 × Choose 9.057 × 10−6 1.078 × 10−5 0.402
Results are from OLS regressions that model the dynamics of the small group (st), assort-
ment (at), and retain endowment effects (gt). Standard errors are calculated according to
Newey &West (1987), a method assuming an error structure that is heteroskedastic and
has possible autocorrelations up to some speciﬁed lag. We speciﬁed a maximal lag of 10.
Independent variables include ﬁrst-order and second-order period terms, both with and
without a treatment dummy. Because assortment is the only mechanism with dynamics
that differ signiﬁcantly by treatment (at: t × Choose and t2 × Choose), the difference in
πt Cð Þ−πt Dð Þ between treatments (Fig. 3A–B) can be traced to a difference in assortment
dynamics between the treatments (Fig. 3C–D).
7C. Efferson et al. / Evolution and Human Behavior 37 (2016) 1–9For all t N 1 in the choose location treatment, players cooperating in t did
so aftermoving to a new location at a rate that was negatively related to
the proportion of players who cooperated in their t-1 social dilemma
neighborhoods (electronic supplementary materials, Table S1, available
on the journal's website at www.ehbonline.org, logistic regression with
two-way clustering, p b 0.001).2 This means that, for players
cooperating in t, they often did so in new neighborhoods after leaving
a neighborhood with a relatively low proportion of cooperators. In con-
trast, they often stayed put and cooperated in the same locations if their
neighborhoods had a relatively high proportion of cooperators. For
players defecting in t, their realizedmovementswere not systematically
related to the rates of cooperation in their neighborhoods from the pre-
vious period (electronic supplementarymaterials, Table S1, available on
the journal's website at www.ehbonline.org, logistic regression with
two-way clustering, p= 0.318).
Cooperators and defectors also moved differently in terms of how
they responded to neighborhood size. Players defecting in t showed a
signiﬁcant tendency to move away from relatively small t-1 neighbor-
hoods (electronic supplementary materials, Table S2, available on the
journal's website at www.ehbonline.org, logistic regression with two-
way clustering, p b 0.001). Because of a weak but highly signiﬁcant neg-
ative relation between the size of neighborhoods and the proportion of
cooperators (electronic supplementary materials, Table S3, available on
the journal's website at www.ehbonline.org, OLS regression with two-
way clustering, p b 0.001), movement away from relatively small neigh-
borhoods suggests that defecting players may have inadvertently
moved away from cooperative neighborhoods. Players cooperating in
t, in contrast, did not show a signiﬁcant relationship between move-
ment and the size of their social dilemmaneighborhoods in theprevious
period (electronic supplementary materials, Table S2, available on the
journal's website at www.ehbonline.org, logistic regression with two-
way clustering, p= 0.078). Importantly, however, these differences in2 Playerswere not told about the proportion of cooperators in their past neighborhoods,
but they could draw aggregate inferences from their payoffs.movement cannot be attributed to differences in the rate of movement.
For t N 1, the overall rates of actual movement in the choose location
treatment were not related to player choices. Cooperating players
moved 32.03% of the time, while defecting players moved 30.07% of
the time (logistic regression with two-way clustering, p = 0.540).
Moreover, both cooperating and defecting players signiﬁcantly in-
creased their rates ofmovement through time (electronic supplementa-
ry materials, Table S4, available on the journal's website at www.
ehbonline.org, logistic regressions with two-way clustering,
p b 0.001). This means that cooperating players did not move more
than defecting players; they simply moved in a different way. In partic-
ular, assortment developed endogenously in the choose location treat-
ment because cooperating individuals ran away from bad behavior,
while defecting individuals did not.
5. Discussion
Our results show that the option to emigrate from one's current
neighborhood can dramatically attenuate the individual-level forces
that would otherwise oppose cooperation. Speciﬁcally, players in our
choose location treatment used movement to assort themselves, statis-
tically speaking, into relatively cooperative neighborhoods. Moreover,
as assortment developed, it meant that cooperators were increasingly
shielded from free-riding, and the average payoffs from cooperating
correspondingly increased. Through time participants managed to en-
tirely eliminate the initial disadvantage associated with cooperating. Fi-
nally, all of this happened even though players did not have information
about the kinds of social interaction they would have if they moved.
These results showmore broadly thatmoving away fromuncooperative
behavior has the potential to signiﬁcantly reduce or eliminate the force
of individual selection against cooperation.
Importantly, moving in our experiment did not involve an explicit
cost. If a participant happened to move from one neighborhood to a
worse neighborhood, shemay have paid an opportunity cost depending
on the movements of others. Participants did not, however, have to
hand over points to move. We thus do not know how an explicit cost
would have affected our results. Cooperating players did not move
more than defecting players in our choose location treatment; they
justmoved in away that was especially sensitive to neighborhood com-
position. This at least suggests the possibility that adding an explicit cost
could reduce the average payoff of cooperating and defecting by similar
amounts. Moreover, a recent study by Bednarik et al. (2014) showed
that increasing the cost of switching to a new partner lowered the rate
of partner switching, but it did not decrease cooperation. Apparently,
themere threat of cutting social ties was enough to keepwould-be defec-
tors in line. This result further suggests that the effects of running away
frombadbehavior could be robust in the face of explicit costs. This is spec-
ulation, however, and the limits of partner choice with different kinds of
explicit costs would beneﬁt from additional empirical research.
We also do not know how effective the mechanismwould be as the
scale of social interactions increases. As with most behavioral experi-
ments, including experiments on partner choice (Barclay & Willer,
2007; Rand et al., 2011; Wang et al., 2012; Antonioni et al., 2014;
Bednarik et al., 2014), social groups in our experiment were relatively
small. Human cooperation is distinctive in that it occurs at large scales
with low genetic relatedness, and the evolution of this kind of large-
scale cooperation may require special mechanisms (Boyd et al., 2011;
Richerson et al., 2015).
In any case, we would like to emphasize that the option to migrate
away from one's neighborhood in the choose location treatment did
not make cooperation superior in terms of expected payoffs. Instead, it
eliminated the difference in average payoffs between cooperating and
defecting, and this in turn allowed players with an interest in
cooperating to do so without paying any cost on average. The result
was a stable mix of cooperation and defection over an extended period
of time. Roughly between periods 10 and 90, the rate of cooperation in
8 C. Efferson et al. / Evolution and Human Behavior 37 (2016) 1–9the choose location treatment was stable at around 40%. This result
demonstrates that, if people with some preference for cooperating are
present, running away from bad behavior can allow them to express
this preference without an associated disadvantage. With respect to
the broader evolutionary question, our results also suggest how endog-
enousmovementmight interactwith other forces. In particular, because
endogenous movement neutralized the selective disadvantage of
cooperation in the choose location treatment, it created the kind of
situation that could allow other forces to play a decisive role.
One candidate force is group competition. With the individual-level
costs of cooperation out of the picture, selection at higher levels of hier-
archical organization can have relatively larger effects. Cultural trans-
mission, in particular, has received considerable attention as a
mechanism that can intensify the importance of selection at the group
level (Henrich, 2004; Richerson & Boyd, 2005; Bell et al., 2009; Bowles
& Gintis, 2011; Boyd et al., 2011; Richerson et al., 2015). Another candi-
date force is increased information, which could makemovementmore
effective. In our experiment, participants were given no individual-
speciﬁc information about the choices and payoffs of other players. As
a result, movement was a blunt mechanism. In this setting, a player
could not use movement to discipline only individuals who were
defecting. Leaving an entire group behind in order to end a relationship
with someone who was defecting also meant abandoning those in the
group who were cooperating. This is analogous to the notion that
reciprocity is hard to sustain in large groups because withdrawing
cooperation punishes everyone in the group, defectors and cooperators
alike (Boyd & Richerson, 1988).
In contrast, reliable information about the choices of speciﬁc players
might have allowed cooperative individuals to use movement in a
targeted fashion (Helbing & Yu, 2009). More generally, signiﬁcant
amounts of reliable information should be especially helpful if players
are not simply restricted to controlling whom they interact with by
moving around in space, but they can instead use the information
more broadly to create and sever social ties. Other experiments show
that this kind of mechanism can support cooperation (Rand et al.,
2011; Wang et al., 2012). The mechanism, however, does rely on con-
siderable amounts of reliable information about the reputations of
others. As discussed in the introduction, reliable information supports
the evolution of cooperation, but it also leads to fundamental questions
aboutwhere the information comes from andwhy its reliability persists
(Antonioni et al., 2014).
For this reason, we restricted our study to information derived from
direct experience. A subject could infer aggregated information about
her recent partners, but she had no information about whom she
would meet or what was likely to happen if she moved. In this sense,
our study excluded third-party informationwhose reliability was exog-
enously assured (Nowak & Sigmund, 1998; Fehr & Gaechter, 2002;
Panchanathan & Boyd, 2004; Rand et al., 2011). We did not do this be-
cause we think information of this sort is never relevant. Rather, we
wanted to see how far limited information based on direct experience
can go in terms of supporting cooperation. Information based on direct
experience is unproblematic precisely because it is readily available to
the individual. Our results show that this kind of limited information,
when coupled with endogenous movement, can play a pivotal role in
supporting cooperation via its ability to attenuate or even eliminate
the individual costs of cooperation.Acknowledgments
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